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Abstract
We show that experimental subjects tend to contribute more to the public good if they perceive the actions of the
others as a source of positive externality rather than a source of negative externality. In our experiment partial
contribution to the public good is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium for the repeated game.
Résumé
Dans cet article, nous montrons que le degré de coopération de sujets placés dans un mécanisme de contribution
volontaire est différent suivant que les choix des sujets induisent des externalités positives (contexte positif) ou des
externalités négatives (contexte négatif). Les sujets participant au contexte positif ont un taux de sur-contribution
supérieur au taux de sur-contribution des sujets participant au contexte négatif. Notre expérience se caractérise par une
stratégie dominante d’investissement partiel dans le bien public.
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1. Introduction
Observed cooperation in public good experiments has not yet received a fully satisfactory
explanation. Cooperation in public good experiments contrasts sharply with behaviour observed in
oligopoly experiments and common pool resources (CPR) experiments. Although, these
experiments have the same strategic environment as public good games, the observed results are, in
this case, compatible with the game-theoretic predictions (see Ostrom et al., 1994). One possible
reason is that in the public good environment subjects perceive the actions of the others as a source
of positive externality, while in the oligopoly or CPR environment they perceive those actions as a
source of negative externality. In order to test this hypothesis, we designed an experiment similar to
Andreoni (1995) which allows a comparison of the two contexts. In the positive context, any token
invested by a member of the group in the public activity, pays off the same amount to each member
of the group. In the negative context, any token invested by a member of the group in her private
activity generates a loss for the other members of the group. Andreoni (1995) found that the
average level of contribution is significantly larger in the positive context compared to the negative
context. However, his result could be due to a particular combination of design options. Andreoni
chose a corner solution design where the dominant strategy is to contribute nothing to the public
good, and a strangers design in which subjects are randomly assigned to one of five groups after
each period. When the dominant strategy is to contribute nothing cooperation can be due to
decision errors. Moreover, in the negative context the strangers design could have reinforced the
feeling of adversity induced by the actions taken by the other subjects. Our experiment is based on
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a public good game for which  the dominant strategy is to contribute a positive amount to the public
good (see Keser (1996)). We chose a partners design, for which subjects are randomly assigned to a
group for the whole duration of the experiment.
Section 2 presents the experimental design , section 3 summarizes the results and section 4
concludes by a short discussion.
2. Experimental Design
Each participant was randomly assigned to a group of four people (including himself) for the 15
periods of the experiment. At the beginning of each period, each subject was endowed with 20
tokens, which he was asked to allocate between a private activity and a public activity. The
constituent game has a dominant strategy equilibrium where each player contributes 7 tokens to the
public activity, which is also the level of contribution predicted by the unique subgame perfect
equilibrium of the repeated game. Because we have an interior solution, over-contribution can
hardly be explained by decision-errors since the cost of a deviation is the same in both directions.
We studied two treatments : the positive treatment is a standard public good game with an
interior solution. We replicated the experiment of Keser (1996) with 15 periods instead of 25. In
the positive treatment each token invested in the public good generates a uniform gain for each
member of the group. In the negative treatment, each token invested in the private activity generates
a loss for the other members of the group. The structure of the game is identical in both treatments.
Only the presentation differs.
2.1. The positive treatment
In the positive treatment, the individual payoff function of agent i is given by:
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Each player i maximizes Pi with respect to (xi, ti) and subject to the budget constraint xi + ti = 20,
where xi is the number of tokens invested in the private activity and ti the number of tokens
invested in the public activity. The reward of the private activity is 
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j t 15 . In the positive treatment, contribution to the public activity
generates a positive externality for other subjects. This becomes clear if we rewrite expression (1)
as:
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The unique Nash equilibrium is 
*
i x = 13 and 
*
i t = 7. Moreover the repeated game has a unique
subgame-perfect equilibrium where each player contributes seven tokens per period to the public
activity. The social optimum requires that each member contributes 20 tokens to the public activity.
2.2. The negative treatment
The negative treatment is simply a rewriting of the reward structure, in which investing in the
private activity appears as generating a negative externality for the other members of the group.
Formally, this is done by taking into account the budget constraint of the other players into player
i’s payoff function (2):3
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The last term of the RHS of equation (4) shows that tokens invested by the three other players
generate a loss for agent i. Of course, the framing has no effect on the game itself. A self-interested
player still has a dominant strategy to contribute seven tokens to the public activity. Also, the
subgame-perfect equilibrium of the 15-period game and the social optimum are the same than in
the positive treatment. Thus, the incentives in both treatments are identical. They only differ by the
framing of the context. Except for the necessary changes required by our particular design, the
instructions are similar to those of Andreoni.
2.3. Practical procedures
The experiment was run on a computer network in Spring 1996. We used the “RatImage” (1995)
toolbox in order to compute the experiment. Four sessions were organized, with 3 groups of 4
subjects per session. A total of 6 independent observations per treatment was collected. The
subjects were recruited by phone from a pool of 500  students, who were willing to participate in an
experiment. Subjects earned 30 FF show-up fee along with their earnings in the experiment. The
average earning was 89 FF, for sessions which lasted about one hour and a half.
Subjects were randomly assigned to a group of four players, to play a 15-fold repetition of the one-
shot game, on a computer terminal, which was physically isolated from other terminals.
Communication was not allowed. The subjects were instructed about the rules of the game and the
use of the computer program through written instructions (available upon request), which were read
aloud. A short questionnaire and two practice rounds followed. Subjects earned points that were
converted at the end of the session. The number of points accumulated since the beginning of the
experiment was on permanent display and subjects could view the payoff history. At the end of a
session each subject was paid privately the total amount he/she had earned during the session.
3. Results
Table 1 shows, for each independent player group, the average token contribution to the public
activity for the 15 periods and for both treatments. In the positive treatment, the average
contribution per subject and per period is 12.39. This corresponds to an average per period over-
contribution rate of 41.46 %
2 per subject. In the negative treatment, the average contribution to the
public activity per subject and per period is 8.26. This corresponds to an average per period over-
contribution rate of 9.69 % per subject.
Table 1
Average contribution for the independent player groups, positive groups (1+ to 6+) and negative groups (1- to 6-)
Group 1+ 2+ 3+ 4+ 5+ 6+ 1- 2- 3- 4- 5- 6-
Average
contribution
13,17 12,63 11,53 9,78 13,20 14,02 9,10 7,80 9,40 6,98 10,00 6,27
                                                          




In the positive treatment, the average contribution is above the subgame-perfect equilibrium
level of contribution (7) for each group. A c
2 test rejects the null hypothesis that the average levels
of contribution are equal to 7 at the 1 % level. This result confirms earlier results that showed that
subjects significantly over-contribute to the public activity with respect to the dominant strategy.
In the negative treatment, the average contribution is not always above seven for each group. A
c
2 test does not reject the null hypothesis that the average levels of contribution are equal to 7 at the
5 % level. Thus, the negative treatment of the public good game with interior solution agrees with
the equilibrium prediction.
Fig. 1 shows the time path of the average contributions to the public activity for both treatments.
In each period the average contributions are above the dominant solution of seven tokens in the
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Fig. 1. Time path of the average contributions to the public activity for both treatments.
Applying a two-tailed Mann-Whitney U test, we can reject the null hypothesis that average
contribution levels are the same in both treatments at the 1 % level. We conclude that subjects
contribute significantly more in the positive framing than in the negative framing. This result is in
line with the observation made by Andreoni (1995). But in contrast to his results, we observe no
significant difference in contribution levels in the first period in the two contexts. The gap arises
only with the repetition of the one shot game, suggesting that it is not the perception of the
environment as such that induces lower contribution in the negative context, but the perception of
the others effective contribution.
4. Discussion and conclusion
We designed an experiment to test Andreoni’s observation that subjects contribute more to the
public good when they perceive the actions of the others as a positive externality rather than a
negative externality. In contrast to Andreoni, our experimental design is based on an interior
solution and on a partners treatment. We observe that the average level of contribution in the
negative treatment is significantly lower than in the positive treatment and agrees with the
equilibrium prediction. Looking at individual contribution levels, the difference might attributed to5
the fact that more subjects over-contributed in the positive treatment. 80,56 % of the subjects
contributed more than 7 tokens in the positive treatment against 43,33 % only in the negative
treatment. The difference is significant at the 1 % level. Moreover, for any integer a, such that 1 £
a £ 13, there are more subjects contributing at least 7+a tokens to the public good in the positive
treatment than in the negative treatment (the difference is always significant at the 1 % level). In the
first period the average level of contribution in both treatments is not significantly different. Since
the difference becomes significant only with the repetition of the game, it must be the case that, on
average, subjects react in the different way to the contribution of the others in the two contexts.
However, a better understanding would require a detailed characterization of individual play in
both contexts.
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